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Abstract
China’s export performance over the past fifteen years has been phenomenal.
Is this performance going to last? Wages are rising rapidly but a population in
excess of one billion represents a large reservoir of labor. Firms in export-intensive
provinces may draw on this reservoir to increase competition in their labor market
and keep wages low for many years to come. We develop a wage equation from a
New Economic Geography model to capture the upward pressure from national and
international demand and downward pressure from migration. Using panel data at
the province level, we find that migration has slowed down Chinese wage increase
over the period 1995-2007.
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1 Introduction
China’s export performance over the past fifteen years has been phenomenal. Its share
of world merchandise exports jumped from 2.5% in 1993 to 5.9% in 2003 and 8.9% in
2007 (WTO, 2008). Imports have also grown but China’s trade balance is substantially
positive. This imbalance is a matter of concern for its main trade partners and the latest
figures may aggravate the growing discontent. According to the EU trade commissioner
Peter Mandelson, “the EU’s trade deficit with China is growing $20 million an hour,”
(June 12 2007, Wall Street Journal).
Low wages are one of the main reasons for Chinese success in capturing world export
markets. In 2004, Chinese average hourly manufacturing compensation is only U.S.$0.67,
i.e. about 3% of the American average (Lett and Banister, 2006).1 However, some analysts
assert that this advantage is only temporary since wages are rising rapidly (Adams et al.,
2006; Lett and Banister, 2006).2 This upward wage trend may erode the once unbeatable
China price and the competitiveness of the export-intensive provinces. On the other hand,
we assert that a population in excess of one billion represents a large reservoir of labor.
If labor is mobile across provinces, firms in export-intensive provinces may draw on this
reservoir to increase competition in their labor market and keep wages low for many years
to come. This paper attempts to shed some empirical light on this debate over wage
setting in China.
1It is worth noting that low wages do not imply low production costs if productivity is also low.
However, using the Penn World Tables 6.3 and a crude measure of productivity, we find that the Chinese
output per worker represents around 12% of the American level. Thus, the US-Chinese difference in
terms of wages appears to be larger than in terms of productivity. Another reason explaining the Chinese
success in export markets is that its GDP accounts for an increasing share of world GDP. Thus, consistent
with trade theory, China captures an increasing share of world merchandise exports.
2Chinese wages increased by 15% per year in 2001 and 2002 (Adams et al., 2006). Besides, total hourly
compensation costs of manufacturing employees increased by nearly 18% between 2002 and 2004 (Lett
and Banister, 2006). See also China’s competitiveness ‘on the decline’, Financial Times, March 22, 2006.
Using our data set over 1995-2007 we confirm this upward trend (see Appendix A).
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Using a new economic geography (NEG) model, we estimate the maximum wage a firm
in a given province can afford to pay given its provincial market access and immigrant
labor supply. The provincial market access (or market potential) is defined as the world
and internal demand each province faces given its geographical position and that of its
trading partners (Harris, 1954; Redding and Venables, 2004). Wages are predicted to be
higher in provinces with high levels of demand. There is some evidence to support this
prediction in China (Lin, 2005; Hering and Poncet, 2010). Wages in coastal provinces
with good market access, such as Fujian, Guangdong and Shanghai, are twice as high
as the national average wage. The provincial immigrant labor supply is defined as the
supply of immigrant labor each province faces due to labor migration. An increase in the
immigrant labor supply is expected to exert a downward pressure on wages.
Migration has long been severely restricted by a specific Chinese institution: the hukou
system. The hukou is a system of household registration. It forces people to live and work
in the place where they have an official registration. This system controls population
movement and renders migration costly since provinces can impose various hurdles to ob-
taining the necessary registration (Au and Henderson, 2006). However, in the mid-1990’s,
the Chinese government has carried out a “deep reform” of the hukou system, notably to
reduce restrictions on mobility (Wang 2004).3 As a consequence of the hukou reforms, mi-
gration has increased dramatically. As an example, between 1995 and 2000, 25.78 million
people between ages 15 and 64 moved from one province to another (Lin et al., 2004) and
predominantly to the export-intensive Southern coastal provinces (Naughton, 2007).4
3Barriers to migration have been relaxed since the mid 1980s (Poncet, 2006) but remained tight (see
Au and Henderson, 2006).
4Lin et al. (2004) document “a significant redirection of migration flows in 1995-2000.” Over this
period inland-to-coast migration nearly doubled to reach a 60.1% share of all inter-provincial migration.
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Using a data set covering 29 Chinese provinces between 1995 and 2007, we investigate
the relative impact of provincial market access and immigrant labor supply on the ave-
rage provincial manufacturing wage. We moreover control for the potential endogeneity
of migration and other explanatory variables via instrumental variables and Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) estimators. The estimates suggest that provincial nominal
wages increase by about 13.5% per year, as documented in the literature (Adams et al.,
2006; Lett and Banister, 2006). However, we also find that migration has moderately
slowed down Chinese wage increase over time. For instance, in the coastal province of
Guangdong, making up approximately 12% of 2007 national GDP, immigration has slowed
down wage growth by about by about 8.64% in total or 0.7% per year.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we outline the theoretical
framework from which the econometric specification used in the subsequent sections is
derived. In section 3, we describe the data sources and discuss some estimation issues.
In section 4, we investigate econometrically the respective contributions of market access
and immigrant share to the determination of wages in China. In section 5, we conclude
and discuss some implications of our results.
2 Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework underlying the empirical analysis is based on a standard new
economic geography model (Fujita et al., 1999; Redding and Venables, 2004). We add
worker skill heterogeneity to control for differences in productivity across regions. Such
differences explain part of the spatial wage disparities (Combes et al., 2007). Using this
simple model, we first derive a so-called short-run equilibrium (see Krugman, 1991), taking
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as given the allocation of workers in each region. Then, we propose a simple strategy,
inspired by the labor economics literature, to estimate the short-run impact of a labor
immigration shock on wages.
2.1 A short-run equilibrium
The economy is composed of i = 1, . . . , R regions. Each region produces differentiated
goods under increasing returns. The utility of a representative agent in region j has a
standard Dixit-Stiglitz form:
Uj =
[
R∑
i=1
niq
(σ−1)/σ
ij
]σ/(σ−1)
, σ > 1, (1)
where qij denotes the demand in region j for a variety produced in region i, ni is the
number of varieties produced in region i, and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution. Dual
to this quantity aggregator is the price index for each region:
Gj =
[
R∑
i=1
ni(piTij)
1−σ
]1/(1−σ)
, (2)
where pi is the mill price of products made in i and Tij > 1 is the usual iceberg trade
costs between region i and region j. Transporting products from one region to another
is costly. Thus, the iceberg transport technology assumes that for every unit of good
shipped, only a fraction
(
1
Tij
)
arrives.
As is well known the value of demand for a variety produced in i and sold in j is given
by
qij = (piTij)
−σ Gσ−1j Ej, (3)
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where Ej is total expenditure of region j. To determine the total sales, qi, of a
representative firm in region i we sum sales across regions, given that total shipments to
one region are Tij times quantities consumed:
qi =
R∑
j=1
(piTij)
−σGσ−1j EjTij = p
−σ
i MAi, (4)
where
MAi =
R∑
j=1
T 1−σij G
σ−1
j Ej, (5)
is the market access of exporting region i (Redding and Venables, 2004: 59). This is given
by a trade cost (Tij) and price index (Gj) weighted sum of the regional expenditures (Ej).
In this simple model, labor is the only factor of production. Following Head and
Mayer (2006), we introduce skill heterogeneity and assume that the labor requirement, `,
depends on both output per firm, q, and average years of schooling, h, as follows:
`i = (F + cqi) exp(−ρhi), (6)
where F and c represent fixed and marginal requirements in “effective” (education-adjusted)
labor units. The parameter ρ measures the return to education and shows the percentage
increase in productivity due to an increase in the average population share with higher
education. Maximizing profits yields the familiar mark-up pricing rule for varieties pro-
duced in region i:
pi =
σ
σ − 1 wi c exp(−ρhi), (7)
Free entry implies that the equilibrium output of any firm is:
q∗ =
F (σ − 1)
c
. (8)
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Using the demand function (4), the pricing rule (7) and equilibrium output (8), we
get the manufacturing wage when firms break even:
wi =
σ − 1
σc exp(−ρhi)
[
MAi
c
F (σ − 1)
]1/σ
. (9)
Despite the lack of any explicit dynamics in the model, it is useful to consider wage
equation (9) as a short-run equilibrium, taking as given the allocation of workers in each
region. This equilibrium is consistent with the existence of frictions in labor mobility
across Chinese provinces due to the hukou system of registration (see Au and Henderson,
2006).
2.2 Deviation from the short-run equilibrium
If restrictions on mobility remain tight, reforms of the hukou system have lowered the
barriers to migration and have increased migration flows (see above). Based on this
evidence, we now work out a deviation from the short-run equilibrium by considering the
effect of an influx of immigrants in a given region i on wages wi. To this end, we proceed
in several steps. First, we rearrange the wage equilibrium equation (9) by determining
the equilibrium labor demand for workers in region i. From equation (6), we can solve for
q using the equilibrium output solution determined in equation (8) and get
`∗i = σF exp(−ρhi). (10)
Then, we turn equation (10) around and express fixed requirements as:
F =
`∗i
σ exp(−ρhi) . (11)
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Replacing (11) in the wage equilibrium equation (9) gives:
wi = (σ − 1)σ−1σ (MAi) 1σ [cσ exp(−ρhi)] 1−σσ `∗−
1
σ
i . (12)
Second, we benefit from the multiplicative form of (12) to operate a log-linear trans-
formation of the model. In addition, we introduce time subscripts t = 1, ..., T to stress
the point of a deviation from the short-run equilibrium
lnwit = α0 + α1 lnMAit + α2hit + α3 ln(`
∗
it), (13)
where α0 gathers the constant terms, α1 = 1σ , α2 =
σ−1
σ
ρ, and α3 = − 1σ , i indexes
region and t time.
Finally, we depart from the short-run equilibrium situation (12) by following the
methodology of Friedberg (2001) and Borjas (2003) in labor economics. Friedberg (2001)
and Borjas (2003) estimate the effect of an immigrant penetration on wages by consid-
ering an exogenous influx of immigrant mi in the region of destination i.5 The rate of
change in labor due to the immigration is defined as a simple first difference ln(`it+1) −
ln(`it) = ln(`it + mit) − ln(`it) = ln
(
`it+mit
`it
)
. Letting z ≡
(
`it+mit
`it
)
and noting that
limz→1 ln z = z − 1, we deduce that ln
(
`it+mit
`it
)
≈
(
`it+mit
`it
)
− 1 = mit
`it
. Consequently, the
wage change resulting from an exogenous influx of immigrants is given by
∆ lnwit = α1∆ lnMAit + α2∆hit + α3
mit
`it
, (14)
5The exogeneity assumption of the immigrant influx is supported by analytical work corroborating
that the hukou system reforms have dramatically increased migration in China (see above). However,
we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that differential of wages across regions could have stimulated
migration. We investigate empirically this endogeneity issue.
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where the ∆ prefix denotes the change from one time period to the next and ∆ ln(`it) ≈
mit
`it
is the immigrant share of region i. The predictions of equation (14) are that (1) the
regression coefficients α1 = 1σ and α2 =
σ−1
σ
ρ are positive; (2) the regression coefficient
α3 = − 1σ is negative; (3) the estimated coefficients α1 and α3 are equal in absolute value,
and (4) the elasticity of substitution (σ) between traded goods is greater than one.
3 Data and endogeneity issues
The core empirical part of this paper explains the variation in average provincial man-
ufacturing wages in China. Before turning to the endogeneity issues of the explanatory
variables, we first describe the data.
3.1 Data
The data set covers 29 Chinese provinces over the period 1995-2007.6 Thus, we get 377
(=29*13) observations. Our explained variable is the average annual nominal wage rate
of manufacturing workers and staff in a province. This is defined as the ratio of the total
wage bill to the number of manufacturing workers and staff by province and year.
We detail now the construction of the market access and the immigrant share va-
riables. Appendix B provides details and sources about the other explanatory variables
and Appendix C provides summary statistics for all of the variables.
Construction of market access
The market access variable is defined as a trade cost and price index weighted sum
6China is divided into 27 provinces plus four province-status “super-cities” – Beijing, Chongqing,
Shanghai and Tianjin. We cover all of the provinces apart from Tibet due to missing observations.
Moreover, Chongqing and Sichuan are considered together.
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of the provincial expenditures (Eq. 5). In order to compute the market access variable,
we exploit information from the estimation of bilateral trade as in Redding and Venables
(2004). Summing equation (3) over all of the products produced in region i, we obtain
the total value of the exports of i to j:
Xij = ni(piTij)
1−σ Gσ−1j Ej = sci φij mcj, (15)
where sci = ni(pi)1−σ measures the “supply capacity” of the exporting region i, mcj =
Gσ−1j Ej measures the “market capacity” of the importing region j, and φij = T
1−σ
ij denotes
the “freeness” of trade (Baldwin et al., 2003).7 In Redding and Venables (2004), trade
costs only depend on bilateral distance between regions. In our empirical approach, regions
refer to Chinese provinces as well as international countries. Consequently, we allow for
differentiated trade cost measures depending on whether trade occurs within province,
within country, between provinces8, between countries or between provinces and countries.
Thus freeness of trade depends on bilateral distance (distij) but also on a set of dummies
indicating whether provincial or foreign borders are crossed.
φij = dist
−δ
ij exp
[
−ϕBfij − ϕ∗ Bf∗ij + ψContigij − ϑ Bcij + ξ Biij + ζij
]
, (16)
where Bfij = 1 if i is a Chinese province and j a foreign country or i a foreign country
and j a Chinese province; Bf∗ij = 1 if i 6= j are two foreign countries; Contigij = 1 if i 6= j
are two foreign countries sharing a land border; Bcij = 1 if i 6= j are two Chinese provinces;9
7φij ∈ [0, 1] equals 1 when trade is free and 0 when trade is eliminated due to high shipping costs and
elasticity of substitution (σ).
8 Note that we face severe data constraints to measure inter-provincial trade in China, since data on
bilateral trade between Chinese provinces do not exist. As a consequence, we use provincial input-output
tables to proxy inter-provincial trade of a province as its trade with the rest of China. Refer to Appendix
D-1 for details.
9Since inter-provincial trade in China is measured by trade between provinces and the rest of China
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Biij = 1 if i = j denote the same foreign country and 0 otherwise. The error ζij captures
the unmeasured determinants of trade freeness. Consequently, this specification allows
the impediments to domestic trade to be different from the impediments to international
trade (see Appendix D for details).
We specify the following log-linear trade regression by first substituting (16) into (15),
and then capturing unobserved exporting (ln sci) and importing (lnmcj) region charac-
teristics with exporter and importer fixed effects (ctyi and ptnj):
lnXij = lnµ+ctyi+ptnj−δ ln distij−ϕBfij−ϕ∗ Bf∗ij +ψContigij−ϑ Bcij+ξ Biij+ζij. (17)
Using a complete data set of trade (see Appendix D),10 we estimate equation (17) in
cross-section, for each year of our sample. The yearly estimated coefficients are then used
to construct predicted values for market access defined as MAi =
∑R
j=1 φijmcj.11 Our
estimated market access variable consists of three parts: local (intra-provincial demand),
national (demand from the rest of China), and worldwide:
M̂Ai = φ̂iiG
σ−1
i Ei +
∑
j∈P
φ̂ijG
σ−1
j Ej +
∑
j∈F
φ̂ijG
σ−1
j Ej (18)
= exp(ptni)× dist−δ̂ii +
∑
j∈P
exp(ptnj)× dist−δ̂ij × exp(ϑ)
+
∑
j∈F
exp(ptnj)
λ̂ × dist−δ̂ij × exp(ϕ̂+ ψ̂Contigij),
where P and F stand for Chinese provinces and foreign countries, respectively. The
results for various years are presented in Table 3 in Appendix D3. Map 1 shows that
(see footnote 8), contiguity between Chinese regions is entirely redundant with the Bcij dummy.
10A complete data set of trade is required to estimate appropriately the market capacity of each trade
partner (within China or abroad).
11Equation (17) allows also to construct a supplier access variable, SAj(=
∑
i φijsci). However, since
market access and supplier access variables tend to be highly correlated (see Amiti and Javorcik (2008)
in the Chinese context), we follow most of the NEG literature and concentrate on market access forces.
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coastal provinces had greater market access and higher nominal wages in manufacturing
in 2002. This pattern is confirmed in the various figures in Appendix D4.
Map 1: Nominal manufacturing wages and constructed market access in China (2002)
 Missing
 7,800 (min) 
 7,900 
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 11,500
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  Bubbles represent the magnitude of the 
provincial market access
Yearly manufacturing 
wages (yuans)
Immigrant share
We rely on the annual Sample Survey on Population Changes to compute (mi
`i
) as the
number of newly arrived non-residents divided by the population.12 We actually assume
that the number of newly arrived non-residents in a province is a good proxy for the
immigrant labor supply (mi). Newly arrived non-residents in a province are defined as the
population living in “township, towns and street communities with permanent household
12The results remain unchanged if we use the number of permanent residents in a province as a proxy
for `i; these are available upon request. Permanent residents are defined as the population “residing in
township, towns and street communities with permanent household registration there”, i.e. in province i.
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registration elsewhere, [and] having been away from that place for less than six months”
as well as the population “with residence registration in this enumeration area not yet
settled”. As a robustness check, we will verify that our results remain unchanged when
this later category (“with residence registration in this enumeration area not yet settled”)
is excluded from the migration variable construction.
3.2 Endogeneity issues
When estimating equation (14), we face a potential endogeneity issue related to our ex-
planatory variable of interest, migration. The literature documents that political reforms
of the hukou system have reduced frictions in mobility and dramatically increased migra-
tion (Wang 2004). However, we cannot rule out the possibility that migration decisions
are also driven by an income differential between the origin and destination locations.
Consequently, the exogeneity assumption of the labor supply shock may be a concern.
To deal with this issue we use initially an instrumental variable approach. The relia-
bility of this method lies on the identification of instruments which are correlated with
migration but uncorrelated with the error term, i.e. with the unobserved component of
wages. A exogenous source of variation in migration may be found in climate variables
(see Roback, 1982). We argue that unfavorable climate conditions in the origin location
of the migrant may increase its probability of migration. We consider two complemen-
tary climate dimensions: annual temperature and annual rain (precipitation) in major
cities of a province. Both dimensions may affect migration. Lin et al. (2004) and Bao et
al. (2007) document that temperatures are significant in explaining migration in China:
“People seem to move to warm areas” (Lin et al., 2004). In addition, there is evidence
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that water scarcity and drought in China cause internal migration. In the beginning of
the 1990s, Homer-Dixon (1994) documents that “tens of millions of Chinese are trying to
migrate from the country’s interior and northern regions, where water and fuelwood are
desperately scarce and the land is often badly damaged, to the booming coastal cities.”
We thus instrument immigration in destination province i based on yearly information on
each climate condition in origin provinces j as an annual weighted average:
Itempti =
∑
j 6=i
temperaturetj
immigrationij∑
j 6=i immigrationij
,
Irainti =
∑
j 6=i
raintj
immigrationij∑
j 6=i immigrationij
,
where the weight is the share of the province of origin j in the total immigration of
province i (termed “immigrationij”) between 1985 and 1990.13 To reinforce the exogeneity
of these two instruments, we exclude information about the destination province i in their
calculation. We also introduce in the wage equation (i.e. the second stage) the annual
averages of temperature and precipitation of the major cities in province i as additional
control variables. This ensures that the instruments are not simply proxying the climate
conditions in the destination province i.
We are however concerned about the potential endogeneity of other explanatory vari-
ables (such as education and market access). Thus, we also estimate the wage equation
using a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. Additionally, we will verify
that our results remain unchanged when our two external climate instruments are added
to the internal instruments in the GMM estimations.
13Such bilateral measures of migration are built from census data and are only available every five
years.
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4 Estimation results
We now proceed to the estimation of our reduced-form wage equation on a panel of 29
provinces over the period 1995-2007.
4.1 Benchmark estimates
Table 1 reports the results of three different estimators: the two-stage least squares (2SLS),
the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) and the Generalized Method of Mo-
ments (GMM). While the first two rely on external instruments and address the endoge-
neity of our main variable of interest (migration), the third resorts to internal instruments
to address the potential endogeneity of all the explanatory variables (including market
access and education).
In the first four columns, we use an instrumental variable approach combined with
provincial fixed effects to address the potential endogeneity of migration. The use of
provincial fixed effects is an alternative to the first differences. It gives similar esti-
mates than differencing and avoids loosing the first time period for each cross section (see
Wooldridge, 2002). We have T time periods for each i, rather than T − 1. The provincial
fixed effects capture province-specific (time-independent) factors such as their surface a-
reas, maritime access, distance to major partners and landlockness. These (unobserved)
factors are important to capture since “cross-region variation in worker characteristics
may reflect regional characteristics that are constant over the sample period” (Hanson,
2005). In addition, we introduce year fixed effects to capture the unobserved effects of
economy-wide changes over time. We also cluster standard errors at the province level.
Finally, we follow Borjas (2003) and address the interpretation problem that a rise in the
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immigrant share can represent either an increase in the number of non-residents or a fall
in population. We thus add the province’s population level in all the specifications. Our
wage equation fits quite well the data by explaining more than 90% of the within variation
in provincial wages.14
In columns 1 and 2, we instrument the immigrant share solely. Relying on an ins-
trumental variable approach allows us to control for any simultaneity between wages and
migration. As described above, we appeal to two different instruments (I temp and I rain),
based on the climate conditions of the original locations. To ensure that our instruments
are not simply proxying the climate conditions in the destination province i, we also in-
troduce in the wage equation the annual averages of temperature and precipitation of the
major cities in province i as additional control variables. As a precondition for the relia-
bility of the instrumental variables procedure, we check the validity of our instruments via
the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. The resulting insignificant test statistics,
reported at the bottom of Table 1, indicate that the orthogonality of the instruments to
the error term cannot be rejected, suggesting that our instruments are appropriate. The
first-stage, common to the 2SLS and LIML estimations, is reproduced in column 1 of
Table 4 in Appendix E. We find that both our climate based instruments enter signifi-
cantly and with the expected (negative) signs. First stage results suggest that warmer
temperature and larger rainfall in the origin locations reduce the intensity of emigrating
to the destination province. However, the F-statistic on the excluded instruments, re-
ported at the bottom of Table 1, is slightly below 10, the informal threshold suggested
by Staiger and Stock (1997) to assess the validity of instruments. This raises a concern
14Since the predicted values of market access are generated from a previous trade regression, we check
the sensitivity of our results using bootstrapped standard errors: the results remained unchanged. The
bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) are available upon request.
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of weak instruments. To address this issue we first report the Stock and Wright (2000)
statistic that provides weak-instrument robust inference for testing the significance of the
endogenous regressors. We do not reject the null hypothesis (with the p-value of 0.12)
that the coefficients of the excluded instruments are jointly equal to zero. In addition, we
check the 2SLS estimates of column 1 with LIML in column 2. LIML is less precise but
also less biased (Angrist and Pisckhe, 2009). Yet, the LIML estimates look fairly similar
to 2SLS.
On the plus side, the LIML standard errors are not too far above the 2SLS standard
errors. Together the Stock and Wright test and the similarity of LIML and 2SLS estimates
tend to support the validity of our excluded instruments.15
In Table 1, from column 3 onward, we also instrument the population level with deep
lags (15 years). In columns 3 and 4, partial F-statistics are now higher and slightly above
10 for population, indicating that the excluded instruments provide a reasonably good fit
in the first stage regressions. We report the first-stage of the additional instrumented vari-
able (i.e. population) in column 2 of Table 4. We find that the 15-year lagged population
has a significant positive impact on current population. The Sargan overidentification
tests (with high p-values) support the validity of the instruments. Again, it is reassur-
ing that LIML estimates (column 4) are almost identical to 2SLS (column 3). These
results are fairly similar to those of columns 1 and 2, with the exception of the population
estimate, which is now statistically insignificant.
We verify that our results are robust when relying on longer time intervals. So far our
estimates are obtained using thirteen yearly intervals for each province. We use instead
15Our findings are coherent with Angrist and Pisckhe (2009: 215) who claim that “This suggests that
you can’t always determine instrument relevance using a mechanical rule, such as ‘F>10” ’.
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Table 1: Manufacturing wage equation
Dependent Variable: ln(Manufacturing wage)
Instrumented variables MIG MIG, POP All variables
Model (1): 2SLS (2): LIML (3): 2SLS (4): LIML (5): GMM (6): GMM augmented
Immigrant share -0.132b -0.135b -0.140b -0.141b -0.024b -0.024b
(0.067) (0.069) (0.062) (0.063) (0.011) (0.011)
ln(Market Access) 0.050b 0.050b 0.047c 0.047c 0.106a 0.106a
(0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.037) (0.037)
Higher education ratio 0.747b 0.761b 0.690 0.701 0.366a 0.366a
(0.367) (0.377) (0.476) (0.484) (0.132) (0.131)
ln(Population) -0.582b -0.577b -0.342 -0.348 -1.150a -1.150a
(0.237) (0.240) (0.572) (0.577) (0.352) (0.354)
ln(Rain) 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.032b 0.032b
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Temperature 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.00006 0.000003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008)
Year 1996h 0.112a 0.112a 0.109a 0.110a 0.118a 0.118a
Year 1997 0.144a 0.144a 0.139a 0.139a 0.180a 0.181a
Year 1998 0.308a 0.307a 0.300a 0.300a 0.370a 0.370a
Year 1999 0.379a 0.378a 0.370a 0.370a 0.462a 0.463a
Year 2000 0.543a 0.542a 0.539a 0.539a 0.599a 0.600a
Year 2001 0.642a 0.641a 0.636a 0.636a 0.719a 0.720a
Year 2002 0.745a 0.744a 0.736a 0.736a 0.849a 0.850a
Year 2003 0.854a 0.852a 0.845a 0.844a 0.961a 0.962a
Year 2004 0.991a 0.989a 0.981a 0.980a 1.111a 1.112a
Year 2005 0.992a 0.990a 0.984a 0.983a 1.112a 1.112a
Year 2006 1.241a 1.239a 1.229a 1.228a 1.385a 1.385a
Year 2007 1.353a 1.350a 1.338a 1.337a 1.525a 1.525a
Observations 377 377 377 377 348 348
Within R2 0.978 0.977 0.976 0.976
Testi H0: α1+α3= 0 χ2(1)=1.5 χ2(1)=1.5 χ2(1)=2.0 χ2(1)=2.0 F(1,29)=3.9 F(1,29)=3.9
First stage:
Migration R2 (%) 2.7 5.88
Migration F-statistic 6.2a 4.85b
ln(Population) R2 (%) 13.33
ln(Population) F-stat 6.53a
Weak instr. testj χ2 4.21 3.30
P-value 0.12 0.35
Overid. testk χ2 0.32 0.31 0.28 0.28 11.11 17.75
AR(1)l -2.79a -2.82a
AR(2) -0.59 -0.59
Notes: All regressions include province and year fixed effects. The table compares 2SLS, LIML and GMM estimates.
First-differencing in the GMM estimates results in the drop of one year (sample size goes from 377 to 348). Clustered
standard errors at the province level are reported in parentheses. a and b denote significance at the 1% and 5%
levels respectively. Immigrant share is defined as non-residents over population. Higher-education ratio is measured
as the share of above 6 years old population with at least high school education. hTo save space, we do not report
the constant and the clustered standard errors of the year dummies (they are available upon request). Depending on
the specification, instrumented variables are Immigrant Share and Population; and excluded instruments are climate
variables (I temp and I rain), and 15-year lagged population. See the text for more details and Table (4) for the
first stage results. i The tests in all columns fail to reject (at the 5% confidence level) the null hypothesis that
the coefficients on immigrant share and market access are equal in absolute value. jStock-Wright weak-instrument-
robust inference test. kThe Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions does not reject the null hypothesis that our
instruments are appropriate. l Significant negative first-order (AR(1)) serial correlation in differenced residuals and
no evidence of second-order serial correlation (AR(2)) in the first-differenced residuals indicate that the orthogonality
conditions cannot be rejected at the one percent level, thus that the error term is not serially correlated.
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two different sets of sub-periods: a first set of four intervals of three-year (1995, 1998,
2001, 2004) and a second set of three intervals of four-year (1995, 2001 and 2007). The
results are reported in Table 5 in Appendix E. The three columns use the same specifica-
tion as column 1 in Table 1. The sample size differs across columns: Column 1 uses the
full sample, column 2 the years 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007, and column 3 the years
1995, 2001 and 2007. The number of observations decreases with the length of intervals
from 377 to 145 and 87. However, our main findings (a negative and significant impact of
immigration shock and a positive and significant impact of market access) remain even if
weaker.
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 1 we rely on internal instruments, using the GMM panel
estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).16 Equation (14) is estimated in first-
difference. As a result, the number of observations drops from 377 to 348. The instruments
for the regression in differences are the right-hand side variables expressed in level, lagged
twice or more. Consistency of the GMM estimates depends on the validity of the instru-
ments. We check their validity using two tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991):
the test for overidentifying restrictions and the test for second-order serial correlation of
the residuals (AR(2)).17 The AR(2) test is asymptotically distributed as a standard nor-
mal distribution under the null of no second-order serial correlation. It provides a further
check on the specification of the model and on the legitimacy of variables dated t-2 as
16We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
17We also report tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals.
If the disturbances it are not serially correlated, there should be evidence of a significant negative
first-order serial correlation in differenced residuals and no evidence of second-order serial correlation in
the first-differenced residuals. Significant second-order serial correlation of the first-differenced residuals
indicates that the original error term is serially correlated and thus that the instruments are misspecified.
Alternatively, if the test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation, we conclude
that it is serially uncorrelated and the moment conditions are well specified.
19
instruments. Overidentifying restrictions will be tested based on the Hansen test that is
asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of
instruments less the number of parameters, under the null of instrument validity. Com-
pared to column 5, column 6 adds (I temp and I rain) to the list of instruments. As can
be seen, this modification leaves the results virtually unchanged. The tests of the consis-
tency of the GMM estimates are reported at the bottom of the Table 1. The AR(2) test
indicates that the orthogonality conditions cannot be rejected at the one percent level,
thus that the error term is not serially correlated. The Hansen test for overidentifying
restrictions does not reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are appropriate. Re-
sults based on the GMM estimator confirm that manufacturing wages in China rise with
market access and decline in response to positive immigration shocks.
While the flavor of the results are similar across the three estimation methods, the
GMM estimator, which addresses the endogeneity of all the explanatory variables, sug-
gests a much lower impact of higher education and immigration and a much higher impact
of market access. Based on the GMM results of column 5 (our preferred specification), it
is useful to interpret the magnitude of the estimated coefficients. Holding other factors
constant, a 10% increase in market access raises wages by about 1.06% on average. In
addition, a one-point increase in the share of population with at least secondary educa-
tion raises wages roughly by 0.4%. Finally, a one-point increase in the immigrant ratio
decreases wages by about 2.4%.
Before elaborating on these results and on the negative impact of the immigrant share
estimate, let us first check the sensitivity of our results.
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4.2 Robustness checks
Table 2 reports additional robustness checks obtained using the GMM estimator. The first
column reproduces our benchmark, i.e. column 5 of Table 1. In column 2, we verify that
our results are not driven by the specific features of the “super-cities”.18 We test whether
the “municipality” provinces are outliers by dropping the observations for the three “super
cities” of our sample (Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai).19 The sample size drops from 348
to 312 observations but leaves our results almost unchanged. We conclude that these
super-cities do not drive all the results and thus keep them in the following regressions.
In column 3, we verify the robustness of our results by using an alternative proxy
for the migration share. We restrict the definition of the newly arrived non-residents
in a province to the population living in “township, towns and street communities with
permanent household registration elsewhere, [and] having been away from that place for
less than six months”. We thus exclude the population “with residence registration in
this enumeration area not yet settled”. This modification does not affect significantly our
benchmark estimates.
In columns 4 and 5, we check for a gender effect. Current international migration is
different from past mass migration, when migrants were disproportionately men (Freeman,
2006). As in current international migration, nearly half of the current migrants in China
are women (see Appendix C). Our results still hold if we take this new trend into account
and redefine the immigrant share as female non-residents over population in column (4),
18We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. Two of the “super-cities” stand out for their
relatively large immigrant shares. The top provinces in terms of immigrant shares for 2007 are Guangdong
(5.2%), Beijing (2.9%), Fujian (2.5%), Zhejiang (1.7%) and Shanghai (1.6%).
19Since Chongqing has been quite recently (in 1997) carved out of the Sichuan province, we choose, to
solve data availability problems, to follow the empirical literature and consider Chongqing and Sichuan
together and thus reconstitute the pre-1997 Sichuan province. As such our sample only includes three
“super cities”: Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai.
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Table 2: Manufacturing wage equation
Dependent Variable: ln(Manufacturing wage) GMM estimator
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benchmark No cities No unsettled Female Male Primary
registration migration migration education
Immigrant share -0.024b -0.038b -0.019b -0.028b -0.021c -0.018c
(0.011) (0.016) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
ln(Market Access) 0.106a 0.068c 0.099a 0.102a 0.061b 0.087b
(0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.024) (0.033)
Higher education ratio 0.366a 0.116 0.320b 0.367a 0.224c 0.156
(0.132) (0.275) (0.125) (0.125) (0.111) (0.114)
ln(Population) -1.150a -1.445b -0.957a -1.161a -0.824a -0.876a
(0.352) (0.531) (0.278) (0.354) (0.200) (0.288)
ln(Rain) 0.032b 0.049a 0.027b 0.030c 0.022c 0.027b
(0.016) (0.017) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011)
Temperature 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.002
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006)
Year 1996h 0.118a 0.114a 0.102a 0.117a 0.097a 0.102a
Year 1997 0.180a 0.181a 0.163a 0.178a 0.155a 0.165a
Year 1998 0.370a 0.344a 0.350a 0.366a 0.324a 0.349a
Year 1999 0.462a 0.448a 0.442a 0.458a 0.422a 0.448a
Year 2000 0.599a 0.617a 0.581a 0.594a 0.564a 0.587a
Year 2001 0.719a 0.734a 0.698a 0.715a 0.677a 0.709a
Year 2002 0.849a 0.853a 0.826a 0.846a 0.796a 0.839a
Year 2003 0.961a 0.977a 0.938a 0.959a 0.916a 0.958a
Year 2004 1.111a 1.135a 1.085a 1.107a 1.056a 1.107a
Year 2005 1.112a 1.135a 1.089a 1.108a 1.059a 1.106a
Year 2006 1.385a 1.401a 1.359a 1.381a 1.324a 1.378a
Year 2007 1.525a 1.542a 1.500a 1.521a 1.468a 1.525a
Observations 348 312 348 348 348 348
Testi H0: α1+α3= 0 F(1,29)=3.9 F(1,26)=0.40 F(1,29)= 4.7x F(1,29)=3.4 F(1,29)=2.3 F(1,29)=3.5
Overid. testj χ2 11.11 9.89 11.23 13.91 10.33 12.06
AR(1)k -2.79a -3.20a -2.80a -2.78 a -2.19b -2.59 b
AR(2) -0.59 -0.62 -0.48 -0.53 -0.51 -0.32
Notes: All regressions are GMM including year fixed effects. The sample size is 348 except in column (2)
where 36 observations for three province-level cities (Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai) over 12 years are dropped
from the sample. Clustered standard errors at the province level are reported in parentheses. a, b and c
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Immigrant share is defined as non-residents
over population in columns (1), (2), (3) and, (6); as female non-residents over population in column (4), and
as male non-residents over population in column (5). In column (6) non-residents do not include population
with unsettled registration. Higher-education ratio is measured as the share of above 6 years old population
with at least high school education in all columns but column (6), where it is measured as the share of
above 6 years old population with at least primary education. hTo save space, we do not report the constant
and the standard errors of the year dummies (they are available upon request). iThe tests in all columns
(but column 3 for which x indicates that H0 is rejected at the 5% confidence level) fail to reject (at the 5%
confidence level) the null hypothesis that the coefficients on immigrant share and market access are equal
in absolute value. jThe Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions does not reject the null hypothesis that
our instruments are appropriate. kSignificant negative first-order (AR(1)) serial correlation in differenced
residuals and no evidence of second-order serial correlation (AR(2)) in the first-differenced residuals indicate
that the orthogonality conditions cannot be rejected at the one percent level, thus that the error term is not
serially correlated.
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and as male non-residents over population in column (5). Again, our results are not
significantly modified.
In column 6, we verify the robustness of our results by using an alternative proxy
for the education level. We reduce the threshold used to compute the higher-education
ratio and rely on the share of the population above 6 years old with at least primary
education. Our results are not significantly affected by redefining the education ratio,
with the exception of the education estimate, which is now statistically insignificant.
4.3 Interpretation of the results
These various robustness checks confirm the negative effect of immigration and the positive
influence of market access and education on wages. Moreover, the structural derivation
of the market access variable from theory provides us with a theoretical interpretation
of its estimate: this figure corresponds to α1 = 1/σ, with σ being the elasticity of subs-
titution between traded goods. As predicted, our estimates (Table 1 and Table 2) of σ
are greater than unity. Based on the GMM estimator, which controls for endogeneity of
our explanatory variables, we obtain estimates of about 10. They are larger than recent
estimates found in the United States context (Hanson, 2005). Based on a NEG model,
Hanson (2005)’s estimates of σ range between 4.9 and 7.6. However, higher elasticities of
substitution are here expected since China trade more homogeneous and less differentiated
goods than the U.S.
To compare the effects of market access and internal migration on wages, we test
whether the difference between the two parameter estimates is statistically insignificant.
Statistics (based either on χ2 test for 2SLS or on F-test for GMM) are reported at the
23
bottom of Table 1 and Table 2. In all but one case (column 3 of Table 2), the tests suggest
that in absolute value the coefficient on immigrant share is equal to the one on market
access (at the 5% confidence level), in coherence with theory (see equation 13).
Our results suggest that both migration and market access effects are statistically
and economically significant. Another interesting result emerges, however. Based on the
estimated year dummies, we find, holding other factors constant, that provincial wages
increased on average by about 13.5% per year between 1995 and 2007.20 This trend is
common to all provinces and has been documented in the literature on shorter period of
time (see above and Adams et al., 2006; Lett and Banister, 2006). Four potential explana-
tions can be advanced for this result. First, the annual growth in total factor productivity
(TFP) may explain part of the national wage increase. Recent estimates suggest that
China’s TFP grew at an annual rate of 4% over the period 1993-2004 (Bosworth and
Collins, 2008). Using a longer sample period (1984-2006), covering the more recent years
that experienced a higher output growth, Li (2009) finds a slightly higher increase of TFP
of 4.65%. Second, the national rise in service-sector prices may also explain part of the
wage increase due to (partial) indexation.21 Between 1995 and 2000, the national con-
sumer price index of services has increased by 14.6% per year on average. After 2000, the
price increase has been slower (e.g. between 2001 and 2007: 3.2% on average per year for
residence services - including water, electricity and fuels; 3.3% for household services).22
Third, social security reforms increasing minimum wages represent also part of the ex-
planation. In 1993, the Chinese government began to reform the social security system
20To calculate this average, we first-difference the year dummy estimates and then compute the geo-
metric mean of the antilog-transformed differences.
21Recall from Equation (5) that we control for the manufacturing price index.
22After 2000, statistics on price of services have been decomposed in different categories. This renders
the comparison before and after 2000 more difficult.
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and established a minimum wage in all China’s provinces, with the exception of Tibet.
In 2006, among all the provinces the highest minimum wages are found in three of our
province-status super-cities: Shanghai (750 Yuan = US$ 94), Tianjin (660 Yuan = US
82.5) and Beijing (640 Yuan = US$ 80). The minimum wage is adjusted each year. Using
data on these super-cities, we compute that minimum wages have increased on average by
a factor 2.2 between 1995 and 2006. Finally, the increased integration of China into the
World economy (e.g. China’s opening up to trade and inward foreign direct investment)
may explain part of the national wage increase. We control for the international market
access evolution, but not for the recent increase in inward foreign direct investment (FDI).
In 2005, China received about a third of the total inward FDI of all non-OECD countries.
Using a panel data set of Chinese cities, Ge (2006) examines the impact of inward FDI
on urban real wages. The results suggest that the existence of FDI has a significant and
positive effect on urban wages and that this impact remains significant after controlling
for other city characteristics.
Overall our estimates highlight that rapidly increasing wages in China correspond to
a common national trend. Since total factor productivity growth appears to explain only
one third of this trend, the China price has increased over the period. In the meantime,
we find that migration flows have moderately slowed down wage increase in China. For
the sake of illustration, we consider the coastal province of Guangdong which is one of
China’s most prosperous provinces. As of 2007, according to our data, Guangdong has
the highest GDP among all provinces. It contributes approximately 12% of national GDP.
Besides, Guangdong’s average migrant share jumped from about 1.7% in 1995 to 5.3%
in 2007. Based on our benchmark estimates (from column 5 of Table 1), a one-point
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increase in the immigrant share induces average wage to fall by approximately 2.4%. In
Guangdong, this implies that immigration has slowed down wage growth by about 8.64%
[=(5.3-1.7)×2.4] in total or 0.7% per year. In coastal provinces, where average immigration
share has increased from 1.03 to 1.62%, this implies that immigration has slowed down
wage growth by about 1.41% [=(1.62-1.03)×2.4] in total or 0.12% per year. The migration
effect on wages has been, so far, moderate. However, with a further and larger relaxation
of migration restrictions, as announced by the export-intensive provinces, inter-provincial
migration may exert a stronger downward pressure on wages.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we examine the impact of access to markets and internal migration on
Chinese provincial wages. We develop a wage equation from a New Economic Geogra-
phy model to capture the upward pressure from national and international demand and
downward pressure from migration. Using panel data at the province level, we find that
migration has moderately slowed down Chinese wage increase over the period 1995-2007.
With a further and larger relaxation of migration restrictions, we may expect a higher
migration effect in the future and a greater erosion of Chinese wages growth.
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Appendix A: Manufacturing wage growth (1995-2007)
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Appendix B: Data description and sources
Our wage equation relies on various economic indicators constructed using China’s Sta-
tistical Yearbooks and listed in the references. They provide data at the provincial level,
including province-status municipalities, on migration, population, climate, surface area,
and average nominal wages for formal employees.
The immigrant share and the market access variables are defined in the core of the
text (see section 3).
The higher-education ratio variable is the share of population aged 6 and over that
declares a secondary or above education attainment. This higher education attainment
is computed based on data collected in the yearly national sample survey on population
change. It is the sum of people which attained junior secondary, senior secondary or
college and higher.
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Appendix C: Summary statistics, 1995-2007
Obs Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Dependent Variable:
Manufacturing Wage 377 10,650 5,561 3,611 39,483
ln(Manufacturing Wage) 377 9.15 0.48 8.19 10.58
Explanatory variables:
Market Access 377 0.026 .065 0.0002 0.441
ln(Market Access) 377 -5.24 1.67 -8.22 -0.82
Higher Education ratio 377 0.53 0.12 0.27 0.83
Rain 377 872.7 501.3 74.9 2678.9
Temperature 377 14.39 5.18 -7.8 25.4
Migration (Tens of thousands):
Newly arrived residents (1) 377 49.1 56.7 2.9 496.9
Newly arrived female residents (2) 377 23.4 26.6 1.7 243.6
Newly arrived male residents (3) 377 25.7 30.3 1.2 273.3
Population (4) 377 4,333 2,794 481 11,847
Immigrant share defined (in %) as:
(1)/(4) 377 1.21 0.76 0.26 5.32
(2)/(female population) 377 1.18 0.72 0.24 5.25
(3)/(male population) 377 1.24 0.82 0.22 5.73
Excluded instruments:
Itemp 377 15.49 2.33 10.24 21.17
Irain 377 941.3 242.3 512.2 1,959.7
15 year lagged population 377 3,673.9 2,457.6 373.7 10,998
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Appendix D: Construction of market access
D1. Bilateral Trade data
Different data sources are used to cover (i) intra-provincial (or intra-national), (ii) inter-
provincial and (iii) international flows. These flows are all merged into one single data
set to compute market access measures for each province based on their exports to all
destinations (domestic and international).
International Data
• International trade flows in current USD come from IMF Direction of Trade Statis-
tics.
• Intra-national trade flows of countries in current USD are computed following Wei
(1996) as the difference between domestic industrial and agricultural production
minus corresponding exports.
• Domestic industrial and agricultural production data for OECD countries come from
the OECD STAN database. For other countries, the ratios of industrial and agri-
cultural production as a percentage of GDP are extracted from Datastream. These
are then multiplied by country GDP (in current USD) from World Development
Indicators.
Chinese Data
• International trade flows of Chinese provinces are obtained from the Customs Gen-
eral Administration database, which records the value of all import and export
transactions passing through customs. Provincial imports and exports are decom-
posed into up to 230 international partners (see Feenstra et al., 1998 and Lin, 2005).
• Inter-provincial trade is computed as trade flows between provinces and the rest of
China and comes from input-output tables. Provincial input-output tables provide
the decomposition of provincial production, and the international and domestic
trade of tradable goods.23
23Most Chinese provinces produced square input-output tables for 1997. A few of these are published
in provincial statistical yearbooks. We obtained access to the final-demand columns of these matrices
from the input-output division of China’s National Bureau of Statistics. Our estimations assume that the
share of domestic trade flows, i.e. between each province and the rest of China, in the total provincial
trade is constant over time.
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• Intra-provincial flows of Chinese provinces are again computed following Wei (1996)
as difference between domestic industrial and agricultural production minus corre-
sponding exports.
• Domestic industrial and agricultural production data for Chinese provinces come
from China’s Statistical Yearbooks. Production in Yuan has been converted into
current USD using the annual exchange rate. The exchange rate is the average
exchange rate of the Yuan against the US dollar in the China Exchange Market and
is obtained from China’s Statistical Yearbooks.
D2. Freeness of trade
The freeness of trade (φij) is assumed to depend on bilateral distances (distij) and a series
of dummy variables indicating whether provincial or foreign borders are crossed.
φij = dist
−δ
ij exp
[
−ϕBfij − ϕ∗ Bf∗ij + ψContigij − ϑ Bcij + ξ Biij + ζij
]
,
We distinguish several different cases, according to whether i and j are provinces
or foreign countries. This equation literally says that we allow for differentiated trade
costs depending on whether bilateral trade occurs between a Chinese province and a
foreign country (−δ ln distij−ϕ+ψContigij), between two foreign countries (−δ ln distij−
ϕ∗ + ψContigij), between a Chinese province and the rest of China (−δ ln distij + ϑ),
within foreign countries (−δ ln distij + ξ) and within Chinese provinces (−δ ln distij). In
the last two cases, only internal distance affects trade freeness. The accessibility of a
Chinese province or a foreign country to itself is modeled as the average distance between
producers and consumers in a stylized representation of regional geography, which yields
φii = distance
−δ
ii = (2/3
√
areaii/pi)
−δ, where δ is the estimate of distance in the trade
equation.
Note that being neighbors dampens the contiguity effect (Contigij = 1 for pairs of
partners which are contiguous) and that ζij captures the unmeasured determinants of
trade freeness, and is assumed to be an independent and zero-mean residual.
D3. Composition of market access
Table 3 reports the estimation results of the trade equation (17). Importer and exporter
fixed effects are included in the regression so that the border effect within foreign countries
(−δ ln distij+ξ) is captured by their fixed effects. The reference category in the regression
is within Chinese-province trade.
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The estimates of distance and contiguity are in line with those in the related litera-
ture. We also confirm that the border effect inside China is important (Poncet, 2003).
Furthermore, we find that impediments to trade are greater between China and the rest of
the world than between the countries included in our sample (which are mostly members
of the WTO and are therefore much more integrated into the world economy than was
China in the 1990s). To capture part of the magnitude of border effects, we can introduce
additional controls. However, this strategy will not much affect the predicted values for
market access. On the one hand, magnitudes of border effects would be reduced, but
on the other hand, the market access would be predicted taking into account these new
controls, which capture part of the reduction in border effects.
Table 3: Trade equation estimates
Dependent Variable: ln(Exports)
Columns (1) (2) (3) (2) (3)
1995 1999 2002 2005 2007
Exporter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Importer fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Ln(Distance) -1.15a -1.18a -1.24a -1.24a -1.23a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Chinese -5.85a -5.98a -5.37a -4.93a -4.57a
Border Effect (Bfij) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.27) (0.28)
Foreign country -3.07a -3.36a -2.37a -3.33a -3.22a
Border Effect (Bf∗ij ) (0.22) (0.21) (0.37) (0.22) (0.23)
Contiguity 1.92a 1.85a 1.90a 2.01a 2.09a
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Provincial -2.82a -2.90a -2.37a -1.70a -1.39a
Border Effect (Bcij) (0.36) (0.38) (0.37) (0.43) (0.45)
No. of Observations 23 386 24 750 26 249 27 240 27 554
R-squared 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.36
Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses, with a denoting significance at the 1% level.
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D4. Market access and average manufacturing wage
The following figures plot the provincial market access as a function of average wage in
log, separately for 1995, 2002 and 2007. We observe higher levels of market access for
high-wage provinces. This is in line with the theoretical prediction of NEG models.
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Market access and average wage in log (2002) 
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Market access and average wage in log (2007) 
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Appendix E: Econometric results
Table 4: First stage regressions
Model of table 1 Cols. (1) & (2) Cols. (3) & (4)
Dependent variable
Immigrant share ln(Population)
Excluded instruments:
Irain -0.00054a -0.00007b
( 0.00017) (0.00003)
Itemp -0.225b -0.0097
(0.098) (0.0084)
15-year lagged Population -0.00007b
(0.00003)
Higher-education ratio 5.037a 0.415a
(1.077) (0.102)
ln(Rain) 0.070 0.0066
( 0.085) (0.0057)
Temperature 0.013b -0.0014
( 0.006) (0.0012)
ln(Population) 1.507
(1.416)
ln(Market Access) 0.095 0.0136b
(0.909) (0.0057)
R2 0.557 0.737
Note: All regressions are first-stage of 2SLS province fixed effects
including year dummies. The sample size is 377. Clustered stan-
dard errors at the province level are reported in parentheses. a, b
and c denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
See text for more details.
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Table 5: Robustness test: long difference on manufacturing wage equation
Dependent Variable: ln(Manufacturing wage)
Model : (1) (2) (3)
Included years all (col.1 Tab.1) 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004 & 2007 1995, 2001 & 2007
Immigrant share -0.132b -0.248a -0.249c
(0.067) (0.096) (0.150)
Market Access 0.050b 0.081b 0.108c
(0.021) (0.038) (0.060)
Higher education 0.747b 1.443b 1.402
(0.367) (0.574) (0.936)
Population -0.582b -0.728a -0.735a
(0.237) (0.265) (0.262)
Rain 0.012 0.036 0.054
(0.014) (0.031) (0.037)
Temperature 0.002 0.032 0.033
(0.002) (0.021) (0.024)
Year 1996i 0.112a
Year 1997 0.144a
Year 1998 0.308a 0.265a
Year 1999 0.379a
Year 2000 0.543a
Year 2001 0.642a 0.610a 0.639a
Year 2002 0.745a
Year 2003 0.854a
Year 2004 0.991a 0.929a
Year 2005 0.992a
Year 2006 1.241a
Year 2007 1.353a 1.226a 1.260a
Observations 377 145 87
Within R2 0.978 0.972 0.980
IV first stage:
Migration R2 2.7 4.9 4.0
Migration F-stat. 6.2a 3.7b 3.3b
Weak testj χ2 4.21 5.00 3.29
P-value 0.12 0.08 0.19
Overidentif. testk χ2 0.32 1.53 1.79
P-value 0.57 0.21 0.18
Notes: 2SLS province fixed effects estimations including year dummies. Clustered standard errors at the
province level are reported in parentheses. a, b and c denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
respectively. See the text for details. iTo save space, we do not report the constant and the clustered
standard errors of the year dummies (they are available upon request). jStock-Wright weak-instrument-
robust inference test. kHansen overidentification J statistic. Both test statistics are cluster-robust.
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